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Abstract
In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few
other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study
under what circumstances the initial behavior of the population has a lasting effect. Our results show that
this question strongly depends on the expected number of actions observed by new agents. Specifically, we
show that if the expected number of observed actions is: (1) less than one, then the population converges
to the same behavior independently of the initial state; (2) between one and two, then in some (but not all)
environments there are learning rules for which the initial state has a lasting impact on future behavior;
and (3) more than two, then in all environments there is a learning rule for which the initial state has a
lasting impact.
Keywords: Social learning, steady state, unique limiting behavior, path dependence. JEL Classifi-
cation: C73, D83.
1 Introduction
Agents must often make decisions without knowing the cost and benefits of the possible choices. In such
situations an inexperienced (or “newborn”) agent may learn from the experience of others, by basing his
decision, on observations of a few actions taken by other agents in the past (see, e.g., the social learning
models of Ellison & Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2011). In other environments, agents interact
with random opponents, and an agent may base his choice of action on a few observations of how his current
opponent behaved in the past (as first described in Rosenthal, 1979, and further developed and applied to
various models of community enforcement in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Takahashi, 2010; Heller & Mohlin, 2017)).
In this paper we analyze a broad class of social learning processes, and study under what circumstances
the initial behavior of the population has a lasting influence on the population’s behavior in the long run. Our
results show that the answer to this question strongly depends on the expected number of actions observed by
new agents. Specifically, we show that: (1) if the mean sample size (expected number of actions observed by
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titled “Unique Stationary Behavior” that presented related results in a narrower setup. We thank Ron Peretz, Doron Ravid,
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a new agent) is less than one then the population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial
state; (2) if the mean sample size is between one and two then any environment allows for a rule with multiple
steady states according to which agents learn from the experience of other agents, but only some environments
allow for learning rules with multiple locally stable states; and (3) if the mean sample size is more than two
then all environments admit a learning rule with multiple locally stable states, and the initial state determines
which steady states will prevail.
Overview of the Model We consider an infinite population of agents (a continuum of mass one). Time is
discrete and in every period each agent is faced with a choice among a fixed set of alternatives. The population
state is a distribution of actions describing the aggregate behavior of agents in the population. In each period
a fixed share of the agents die and are replaced with new agents. Each new agent observes a finite sequence
of actions (called a sample) of random size. The sample may consist either of past actions of random agents
in the population (as in the social learning models mentioned above) or past actions of the current, randomly
drawn, opponent (as in the community enforcement models mentioned above).
An environment is a tuple that specifies all the above components. A learning rule specifies the distribution
of actions played by new agents as a function of the observed sample. The agent keeps playing the same action
throughout his life. The environment and the learning rule jointly induce a mapping between population states
that determines a new population state for each initial state. A population state is a steady state if it is a
fixed point of this mapping.
Characterization of Multiple Steady States Theorem 2 fully characterizes in which environments there
exist learning rules that admit multiple steady states. Specifically, it shows that an environment allows for a
learning rule that admits multiple steady states if and only if the mean sample size is strictly more than one
(or if agents always observe a single action). In the opposite case, each learning rule admits a unique steady
state, and, moreover, the population converges to the unique steady state from any initial state.
The intuition for the “only if” side is as follows. Consider two different initial population states of an
environment with a mean sample size below one. The aggregate behavior of new agents may differ only to the
extent in which they observe different distributions of samples. This implies that the distance between the
distributions of actions played by new agents is bounded by the distance between the distributions of samples
that they observe. One can show that this latter distance is bounded by the distance between the distributions
of actions played by the incumbents multiplied by the mean sample size. Hence, if the mean sample size is
less than one, the distance between the distributions of actions of new agents is strictly less than the distance
between the distributions of actions of the incumbents, which implies that the mapping between population
states is a contraction mapping.
The “if” side relies on constructing a specific learning rule, according to which agents play action a′ if
they observe action a′ in their sample, and play action a′′ otherwise. One can show that such a learning rule
always admits two different steady states provided that the expected number of observed actions is greater
than one. We demonstrate that this learning rule (as well as all other learning rules used in the other results
in the paper) may be consistent with Bayesian inference and the agents using best replies.
Characterization of Multiple Locally Stable States A steady state is locally stable if the population
converges back to this state after any sufficiently small perturbation. Arguably, the initial state can be said
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to have a lasting effect only when there are multiple locally stable states. In particular, in the construction
of the above result (Theorem 2), only one of the steady states is locally stable. Moreover, one can show that
a population converges to this state from almost all initial states. Our remaining results characterize when
there are learning rules that admit multiple locally stable states.
Theorem 3 shows that in any environment in which the mean sample size is larger than two it is possible
to define a learning rule that admits multiple locally stable states. According to this learning rule, each new
agent (1) plays action a′ if he observes action a′ at least twice in his sample, (2) plays action a′′ if he never
observes action a′, and (3) mixes between the two actions if he observes action a′ exactly once. We show that
this learning rule (with a well-calibrated mixing probability) admits two locally stable states, one in which a′
is never played, and the other in which it is played with a positive probability.
Our next two results show that when the mean sample size is between one and two, then some (but not all)
environments allow for learning rules that admit multiple locally stable states. Specifically, we show that if
each new agent observes at most two actions, and there are two feasible actions, then any learning rule admits
a unique locally stable state, and, moreover, the population converges to this state from almost all initial
states. The intuition is that when the sample size is at most two, then the mapping induced by the learning
process can be represented as a polynomial of degree two. Hence, the mapping can have at most two steady
states, and it is relatively straightforward to show that at most one of these states can be locally stable.
Finally, we show that an environment with two feasible actions a′, a′′ in which some agents observe a
single action, while others observe three actions, and each new agent chooses the frequently observed action
in his sample, admits two locally stable states: one in which all agents choose action a′, and another in which
everyone chooses action a′′ (in addition, to an unstable state in which half of the population plays each action).
Extensions Our results so far have not assumed anything about the agents’ learning rules. Obviously,
additional information on the learning rules, may allow us to achieve stronger results. Next, we present a
simple notion that measures how responsive a learning rule is to different samples. For example, a learning
rule might be relatively unresponsive due to new agents having strong priors about which action is best. We
use this notion of responsiveness to define the effective sample size of a learning process (which is always
weakly smaller than the simple mean sample size). Next, we apply the notion of effective sample size to derive
a tighter upper bound for learning processes that admit unique steady states.
Finally, we extend our model and main results to (1) heterogeneous populations in which agents are endowed
with different types, and the various types differ in their sample sizes and learning rules, (2) non-stationary
environments, in which the distribution of sample sizes and the agents’ learning rules depend on calendar time,
and (3) stochastic shocks that influence the learning rules of all agents (at the aggregate level).
Related Literature Various papers have studied different aspects of the question of when the initial behav-
ior of the population has lasting effects on social learning processes. Most of this literature focuses on specific
learning rules, according to which new (or revising) agents myopically best reply to the empirical frequency of
the observed actions. Arthur (1989) (see related models and extensions in Arthur, 1994; Kaniovski & Young,
1995; Smith & Sorensen, 2014) studies games in which agents sequentially choose which competing technology
to adopt, and he shows that social learning is path-dependent if the technologies have increasing returns.
Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993a) study models of finite large populations that are involved in a
social learning process, and agents occasionally make mistakes (e.g., an agent adopts a technology that is not
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his myopic best reply to his sampled information). They show that the path dependency of the social learning
process vanishes when infinite time horizons are considered. In many cases, when the probability of mistakes
is sufficiently small the population spends almost all the time in a unique “stochastically stable state,” which
is independent of the initial state. A key difference between our model and theirs is that we model an infinite
population, rather than a large finite population. In Section 6, we discuss the relations between the present
paper and the literature on stochastic stability, and, in particular, the implications of our results for finite
large populations.
Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004) study a model with a continuum of agents in which a fixed share of new agents
in each period choose one of two technologies. There are two possible states of nature, and each technology
has a higher quality in one of these states. Each agent, after he observes l past actions and a noisy signal
about the quality of each technology, chooses the technology with the higher expected quality, conditional
on the information that he has observed. Banerjee & Fudenberg show that when l ≥ 2 the behavior of the
population converges to everyone choosing the efficient technology, while if l = 1 the population converges to
an inefficient state in which only some of the agents choose the (ex-post) better technology.
Sandholm (2001) shows that when each new agent observes k actions and the game admits a 1k -dominant
action a∗ (i.e., action a∗ is the unique best reply against any mixed strategy assigning a mass of at least 1k
to a∗), then social learning converges to this action regardless of the initial state. Recently, Oyama et al.
(2015) strengthened this result by extending it to iterated p-dominant actions, and by showing that global
convergence is fast.
Our model differs from all the above-mentioned research in that we study general environments and arbi-
trary learning rules. Specifically, we ask what properties of the agents’ sampling procedures imply that any
learning rule admits a unique steady state and global convergence to this state, whereas the existing literature
focuses on the dynamic behavior induced by a specific learning rule (in most of the literature, the agents
myopically best reply to specific payoffs, such as those induced by competing technologies with increasing
returns).
Structure We present motivating examples in Section 2. The basic model is described in Section 3. Section
4 presents our main results. In Section 5 we define and apply the notion of a responsiveness of a learning rule.
We conclude in Section 6. Appendix A extends the basic model to heterogeneous populations, non-stationary
processes, and common stochastic shocks. Technical proofs are presented in Appendix B–.
2 Motivating Examples
In this section we present three motivating examples, which will be revisited further below to demonstrate the
applicability of our model and the implications of our results. In all the examples the population is modeled as
a continuum of mass one, and time is discrete. The main example deals with social learning with competing
technologies, while the other two examples study situations in which agents are randomly matched to play a
two-player game.
Example 1 (Main Motivating Example: Competing Technologies with Increasing Returns1). Consider a
population in which in each period a share β ∈ (0, 1) of the incumbent agents die, and are replaced with new
1The example is similar to the model of Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004), except that the technologies have increasing returns,
rather than having unknown inherent different qualities.
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agents. Each new agent chooses one of two competing technologies a′ and a′′, which he adopts for the rest of
his life. The technologies have increasing returns. A share of 99% of the new agents observe the technology
followed by a single random incumbent, and then they choose to adopt this observed technology.
We consider two cases for what the remaining 1% of the new agents observe before they choose a technology
(as summarized in Table 1):
1. They observe nothing, and in this case half of the new agents adopt technology a′, and the other half
adopt technology a′′.
2. They observe the technologies adopted by three random incumbents, and in this case each new agent
adopts the technology chosen by the majority of his sample.
Let α1 ∈ [0, 1] describe the share of agents who use technology a′ initially (in the first period). One can
show that in Case (1), in which the mean sample size of a new agent is slightly less than one, the population
converges to a unique steady state in which half of the agents follow each technology. By contrast, in Case
(2), in which the mean sample size is slightly more than one, the initial behavior of the population has a
lasting effect. Specifically, the population converges to everyone following technology a′ if initially a majority
of the agents followed technology a′ (i.e., if α1 > 50%), and the population converges to everyone following
technology a′′ if α1 < 50%.
Table 1: Summary of the Two Cases in Example 1
Case Probability of Observing MeanSample Size Convergence and steady states0 actions 1 action 3 actions
1 1% 99% - 0.99 Global convergence to 50%–50%
2 - 99% 1% 1.02 Convergence to a′ if α1 > 0.5;
convergence to a′′ if α1 < 0.5.
We conclude this example by noting that the described behavior is consistent with each new agent playing
a unique best reply, if we make the following further assumptions. Nature privately chooses the initial share
of agents who follow each technology in the first period. In each later period, new agents have a symmetric
common prior on this initial share (e.g., the common prior might be that α1 is uniformly distributed on2 [0, 1]).
The payoff of each new agent is increasing in the current share of agents who follow the same technology (i.e.,
the technologies have increasing returns), and hence agents have an incentive to play the action that they
believe that the majority is playing. In addition, half of the agents have a weak preference for technology
a′, and the remaining half have a weak preference for technology a′′. These idiosyncratic preferences are
much smaller than the payoff differences due to the increasing returns. For example, assume that if 51% of
the population follow technology a′, then an agent prefers technology a′ regardless of his own idiosyncratic
preference.
Example 2 (Community Enforcement in the Prisoner’s Dilemma). Consider a population such that in each
round each agent is randomly matched with three opponents, and plays a Prisoner’s Dilemma with each of
them. In round one, each agent defects with probability α in each match. In any later round and match, with
a probability of 95% each agent observes two actions played in the previous period by the current opponent
2As argued by Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004, p. 5), the aggregate uncertainty about the initial population state may reflect
the choices of a group of “early adopters” whose preferences are uncertain even at the aggregate level.
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(i.e., actions played by the current opponent against two of his three opponents in the previous period). With
the remaining probability of 5% each agent observes k actions played by the current opponent in the previous
period. We consider two cases: (1) k = 1, and (2) k = 3. All agents follow the same behavior (in both cases):
(I) an agent defects if he observes his partner defecting more times than cooperating, (II) an agent cooperates
if he observes his partner cooperating more times than defecting, and (III) an agent defects with probability
51% if he observes the partner defecting and cooperating an equal number of times.
One can show that in both cases the environment admits two steady states: one in which all agents cooperate,
and one in which all agents defect. In the first case (k = 1, in which the mean sample size is slightly below 2),
only the state in which all agents defect is locally stable. Specifically, the population converges to everyone
defecting for any α > 0. By contrast, in the second case (k = 3, in which the mean sample size is slightly
above 2), both steady states are locally stable. In particular, one can show that the population converges to
everyone defecting if α > 31%, and it converges to everyone cooperating if α < 31%.
Example 3 (Rock-Paper-Scissors). Consider a population in which each agent is randomly matched in each
round to play the rock-paper-scissors game. Each player has three pure actions (r, p, s), and each action is the
unique best reply to the previous action (modulo 3). In the initial round t = 1 the aggregate distributions of
actions is γˆ ∈ ∆ (r, p, s). In each later round, each agent observes the opponent’s action in the previous round
with probability q, and best replies to the observed action. With the remaining probability of 1− q the agent
observes no actions, and plays the mixed action γ′ ∈ ∆ (r, p, s).
Observe that the parameter q is equal to the mean sample size of a random agent. If q = 1 it is immediate
that the population’s behavior cycles “around” permutations of the initial behavior (as is common in evolu-
tionary models of rock-paper-scissors; see, e.g., the analysis in Cason et al., 2014). Formally, let t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...},
then in round 3 · t+ 1 (resp., 3 · t+ 2 , 3 · t+ 3 ) agents play r with a probability of γˆ (r) (resp., γˆ (s), γˆ (p)),
p with a probability of γˆ (p) (resp., γˆ (r), γˆ (s)), and s with a probability of γˆ (s) (resp., γˆ (p), γˆ (r)). By
contrast, when q < 1, one can show that the population converges to the following unique behavior (regardless
of the initial behavior γˆ):
Pr (r) = γ
′ (r) + pγ′ (s) + q2γ′ (p)
1 + q + q2 , Pr (p) =
γ′ (p) + qγ′ (r) + q2γ′ (s)
1 + q + q2 , Pr (s) =
γ′ (s) + qγ′ (p) + q2γ′ (r)
1 + q + q2 .
Note that when q is close to one, the unique behavior is close to the uniform mixed profile that assigns a
probability of 13 to each action.
3 Model
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to distributions with a finite support. Given a (possibly infinite)
set X, let ∆ (X) denote the set of distributions over this set that have a finite support. With slight abuse of
notation we use x ∈ X to denote the degenerate distribution µ ∈ ∆ (X) that assigns probability one to x (i.e.,
we write µ ≡ x if µ (x) = 1). We use N to denote the set of natural numbers including zero.
Population state. Consider an infinite population of agents. More precisely, the population consists of a
continuum of agents with mass one. Time is discrete and in every period (or “round”) each agent is faced with
a choice among a fixed set of alternatives A. Let A be a finite set of at least two actions (i.e., |A| ≥ 2).
6
The population state (or state for short) is identified with the aggregate distribution of actions played in
the population, denoted γ ∈ ∆ (A). Let Γ denote the set of all population states.
New/Revising agents. In each period, a share of 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents exit the population and are
replaced with new agents, while the remaining 1− β share of the agents play the same action as they played
in the past (see, e.g., Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Each new agent chooses an action based on a sample of a
few actions of incumbents. The agent then keeps playing this chosen action throughout his active life, possibly
because the initial choice requires a substantial action-specific investment, and it is too costly for an agent
to reinvest in a different action later on. The model can also be interpreted as describing a fixed population
in which each agent reevaluates his action only every 1β periods (under this interpretation, when the sample
is non-empty, the first observed action after a revision might be interpreted as the revising agent’s own past
action).3
Sample. Each new agent observes a finite sequence of actions (or sample). The size of the observed sample
is a random variable with a distribution ν ∈ ∆ (N). Let M denote the set of all feasible samples, i.e.,
M = ∪l∈supp(ν)Al, where A0 = {∅} is a singleton consisting of the empty sample ∅.
Let l¯ = max (supp (ν)) < ∞ be the maximal sample size. Note that M is finite in virtue of the finite-
support assumption. For each sample size l ∈ N, let ψl : Γ → ∆
(
Al
)
denote the distribution of samples
observed by each agent in the population (or sampling rule for short), conditional on the sample having size
l. A typical sample of size l is represented by the vector −→a = (a1, ..., al).
We assume that each agent independently samples different agents, and observes a random action played
by each of these agents. This kind of sampling is common in models of social learning (see, e.g., Ellison &
Fudenberg, 1995; Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Formally, we define for each sample size l ∈ N, each state
γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a1, ..., al),
ψl,γ (a1, ..., al) =
∏
1≤i≤l
γ (ai) . (1)
Environment. An environment is a tuple E = (A, β, ν) that includes the three components described above:
a finite set of actions A, a fraction of new agents at each stage β, and a distribution of sample sizes ν.
Given environment E = (A, β, ν), let µl denote the mean sample size, i.e., the expected number of actions
observed by a random agent in the population. Formally:
µl =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · l.
Learning rule and stationary learning process. Each new agent chooses his action in the new population
state by following a stationary (i.e., time-independent) learning rule σ : M → ∆ (A). That is, a new agent
who observes sample m ∈ M plays action a with probability σm (a) . The remaining 1 − β agents play the
same action as in the previous round.
A learning process is a pair P = (E, σ) consisting of an environment and a learning rule.
3The learning process is unaffected by having the first observed action be the agent’s own past action, due to the fact that the
population is a continuum, and the behavior of the revising agents coincides with the aggregate behavior in the population.
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Population dynamics. An initial state and a learning process uniquely determine a new state. To see this
note that since the number of messages M , and actions A are finite, whereas the population is a continuum,
the probability that an agent observes a message m and switches to an action a is equal to the fraction of
agents who observe a message m and switch to an action a. For this reason we say that the learning process
is deterministic, despite the fact that the choice of an individual agent may be stochastic.
Time is discrete in our model. Let fP : Γ→ Γ denote the mapping between states induced by a single step
of the learning process P . That is, fP (γˆ) is the new state induced by a single step of the process P , given
an initial state γˆ. Similarly, for each t > 1, let f tP (γˆ) denote the state induced after t steps of the learning
process P , given an initial state γˆ (e.g., f2P (γˆ) = fP (fP (γˆ)), f3P (γˆ) = fP (fP (fP (γˆ))), etc.).
L1-distance. Throughout the paper we measure distances with the L1-distance (norm). Specifically, let
the L1-distance between two distributions of samples ψl,γ , ψl,γ′ ∈ ∆
(
Al
)
of size l, be defined as follows:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 =
∑
m∈Al |ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| .
Similarly the L1-distance between two distributions of actions γ, γ′ ∈ ∆ (A) is defined as follows:
‖γ − γ′‖1 =
∑
a∈A
|γ (a)− γ′ (a)| .
Steady States and Stability We say that γ∗ is a steady state with respect to the stationary learning
process P , if it is a fixed point of the induced mapping fP , i.e., if fP (γ∗) = γ∗.
Steady state γ∗is (asymptotically) locally stable if a population beginning near γ∗ remains close to γ∗, and
eventually converges to γ∗. Formally, for each  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that ‖γˆ − γ∗‖ < δ implies that:
(1)
∥∥f tP (γˆ)− f tP (γ∗)∥∥ <  ∀t ≥ 1 ,(2) limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗.
Steady state γ∗ is an (almost-)global attractor, if the population converges to γ∗from any (interior) initial
state, i.e., if
limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗ for all γˆ ∈ Γ (γˆ ∈ Int (Γ)) , .
where Int (Γ) denotes the set of totally mixed distributions of actions (distributions that assign positive prob-
ability to all actions).
We conclude by demonstrating how the model captures motivating Examples 1–3.
Example 1 (Competing Technologies revisited). The environment in which agents choose to adopt one of two
competing increasing returns technologies is modeled by a learning process P = ({a′, a′′} , β, ν, σ) ,
in which {a′, a′′} is the set of competing technologies, β ∈ (0, 1) is the share of new agents that
join the population in each round, and the learning rule of the agent is defined as
σ (−→a ) =

0.5 · a′ + 0.5 · a′′ −→a = ∅
a′ −→a ∈ {a′, (a′, a′, a′) , (a′′, a′, a′) , (a′, a′′, a′) , (a′, a′, a′′)}
a′′ otherwise.
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The initial population state is given by γˆ (a′) = α. Finally, the distribution of sample size is:
Case I: ν (l) =
1% l = 099% l = 1 Case II: ν (l) =
1% l = 399% l = 1.
Observe that the mean sample size (µl) is equal to 0.99 in Case I, and is equal to 1.02 in Case II.
Example. 2 (Prisoner’s Dilemma revisited). The environment in which agents play the Prisoner’s Dilemma
is modeled by a learning process
P = ({c, d} , , β = 1, ν, σ) ,
where ν (2) = 95%, and in Case (1) ν (1) = 5%, while in Case (2) ν (3) = 5%. In Case (1) the learning rule is
given by:
σ (c, c) = σ (c) = c, σ (d, d) = σ (d) = d, σ (c, d) = σ (d, c) = 51% · d+ 49% · c.
In Case (2) the learning rule is given by:
σ (c, c) = σ (c, c, c) = σ (c, c, d) = σ (c, d, c) = σ (d, c, c) = c,
σ (d, d) = σ (d, d, d) = σ (d, d, c) = σ (d, c, d) = σ (c, d, d) = d, σ (c, d) = σ (d, c) = 51% · d+ 49% · c.
Observe that µl = 1.95 in Case (1) , and µl = 2.05 in Case (2).
Example 3 (Rock-Paper-Scissors revisited) The environment in which agents play the rock-paper-scissors
game is modeled by a learning process P = ({r, p, s} , β = 1, ν, σ) , and the initial population state is
given by γˆ. The distribution of the sample size and the learning rule are given by
ν (l) =
0 1− p1 p, σ (a) =

r a = s
p a = r
s a = p.
σ (∅) = γ′.
Observe that the mean sample size is equal to p (i.e., µl = p).
4 Main Results
4.1 Upper Bound on the Distance between New States
Our first result shows that the distance between two new states is at most 1 − β + β · µl times the distance
between the two initial states. The intuition is as follows. Consider two different initial population states
γ and γ′. The incumbents who do not die (a share of 1 − β) continue to behave as before, and hence the
distance between the distributions of actions of those agents remains ‖γ − γ′‖. The aggregate behavior of
new agents may differ only to the extent that they face different distributions of samples. This implies that
the distance between the distributions of actions played by new agents is bounded by the distance between
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the distributions of samples that they observe. By using the triangle inequality one can show that this latter
distance is bounded by the distance between the distributions of actions played by the incumbents (‖γ − γ′‖)
multiplied by the mean sample size (µl). Finally, due to another use of a triangle inequality, this implies that
the distance between the new population states is at most (1− β + β · µl) · ‖γ − γ′‖1. Formally,
Theorem 1. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a learning process, and let γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ be two population states. Then:
‖fP (γ)− fP (γ′)‖1 ≤ (1− β + β · µl) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if there exists an l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
(Sketch of proof. Formal proof is presented for the more general result of Theorem 8 in Appendix B.1.)
The distance between the final population states is bounded as follows:
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
ν (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 . (2)
The intuition of this inequality is as follows. The first part of the RHS of Eq. (2) reflects the actions played
by the β new agents. The social learning stage may induce different behaviors for new agents who observe
samples of size l only if they observe different samples. Thus, taking the weighted average of the distances
between samples yields the bound on how much the aggregate behaviors of the new agents may differ (i.e.,∑
l∈N ν (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1). Finally, the mixed average of this expression and the behavior of the incumbents,
gives the total bound on the difference between the final population states.
Next, observe that the distance between distributions of samples is bounded by the sample size times the
distance between the distributions of actions:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if l > 1. This is so because the event that two samples of size l differ is (a non-disjoint)
union of the l events: the first action in the samples differ, the second action in the samples differs, ..., the
last lth action in the samples differ.
Substituting the second inequality in (2) yields:
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
ν (l) · l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 =
(
β ·
(∑
l∈N
ν (l) · l
)
+ (1− β)
)
· ‖γ − γ′‖ = (β · µl + 1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖ = (1− β + β · µl) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if there exists an l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
Observe that 1 − β + β · µl < 1 iff µl < 1. Recall that mapping f is a weak contraction (or shrinking) if
‖(f (γ))− (f (γ′))‖ < ‖γ − γ′‖ for each γ 6= γ′. Theorem 1 implies that fP is a weak contraction mapping if
either (1) µl < 1, or (2) µl = 1 and4 ν (1) < 1. The fact that the mapping fP is a weak contraction mapping
4Note that µl = 1 and ν (1) < 1 jointly imply that there exists l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
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implies that fp admits a global attractor.5 Formally:
Corollary 1. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a stationary learning process satisfying (1) µl < 1, or (2) µl = 1 and
ν (1) < 1. Then fP is a weak contraction mapping, which implies that (1) fP admits a unique steady state γ∗,
and (2) this unique steady state γ∗ is a global attractor (i.e., limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗ for each γˆ ∈ Γ).
4.2 Full Characterization of Environments that Admit Multiple Steady States
Our main result fully characterizes which environments allow for learning rules for which the past casts a long
shadow. Specifically, it shows that an environment allows a learning rule that admits multiple steady states
iff µl > 1 (alternatively if all agents sample exactly one action). In the opposite case (µl ≤ 1) each learning
rule admits a unique steady state, and, moreover, the population converges to the unique steady state from
any initial state. Formally:
Theorem 2. Let E = (A, β, ν) be an environment. The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. µl > 1, or ν (1) = 1.
2. There exists a learning rule σ∗, such that the learning process (E, σ∗) admits two different steady states.
Proof. Corollary 1 immediately implies that ¬1⇒¬2. We are left with the task of showing that 1⇒ 2.
Case A: Assume that ν (1) = 1 (i.e., each new agent in the population observes a single action). Consider
the learning rule in which each agent plays the action that he observed, i.e., σ∗ (a) = a. Let γ be an arbitrary
population state. Observe that γ is a steady state of the learning process (E, σ∗) because:
(fP (γ)) (a) = γ (a) .
Case B: Assume that µl > 1. Let a and a′ be different actions (a 6= a′ ∈ A). Let σ∗ be a learning rule
according to which each agent plays action a∗ if he has observed action a∗ at least once, and plays action a′
otherwise, that is,
σ∗
(
al
)
=
a∗ ∃i, s.t., ali = a∗a′ otherwise.
It is immediate that the population state in which all agents play action a′ (i.e., γ (a′) = 1 ) is a steady state
of the learning process (E, σ∗). We now show that there exists x > 0, such that the population state γx in
which all agents play action a∗ with probability x, and play action a′ with the remaining probability of 1− x
(i.e., γx (a∗) = x and γx (a′) = 1−x) is another steady state of the learning process (E, σ∗). Observe that the
state γx is consistent with the learning process (E, σ∗) if and only if
(fP (γx)) (a∗) =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · 1
|A|l
·
∑
~a∈Al
1(∃i s.t., ai=a∗) =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) ·
(
1− (1− x)l
)
≡ g (x) . (3)
Observe that: (1) g (x) (defined in (3) above) is continuous and differentiable, (2) the derivative of g (x)
is given by g′ (x) =
∑
l∈supp(ν) ν (l) · l · (1− x)l−1, (3) g′ (0) =
∑
l∈supp(ν) ν (l) · l = µl > 1, (4) g (0) = 0, and
5See Pata (2014, Theorem 1.7) for a formal proof that any weak contraction mapping on a compact metric space admits a
global attractor (see also the sketch of the proof in Munkres, 2000, Section 28, Exercise 7). We thank Xiangqian Yang for kindly
referring us to these proofs.
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(5) g (1) ≤ 1. These observations imply by the intermediate value theorem that there is x∗ > 0 such that
g (x∗) = x∗, and hence γx∗ is an additional steady state of the learning process (E, σ∗).
Remark 1. We note that the learning rules constructed in the proof above can be consistent with Bayesian
inference and best-replying in plausible setups. The learning rule in Case A (playing the observed action)
induces a Nash equilibrium in a setup with competing technologies with increasing returns and uncertainty
about the initial population state, such as the setup presented in Example 1.
The learning rule in Case B induces a Nash equilibrium in the following setup of two competing technologies
with uncertainty about their quality. There are two states of the world. In State 1 technology a∗ has a higher
quality, and in state 2 technology a′ has a higher quality. The technology with the higher quality yields a
payoff of one to an agent who follows it, and the technology with the lower quality yields a payoff of zero.
State 1 has a prior probability of 60%. In state 1, 10% of the agents follow technology a∗ in the first period,
and the remaining agents follow technology a. In state 2, all agents follow technology a′ in period one (i.e., the
setup has a payoff-determined initial popularity a` la Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Observe that the unique
Nash equilibrium in this setup is for an agent to play a∗ when observing a∗ at least once (as in this case the
agent knows for sure that action a∗ has a higher quality), and to play a′ otherwise (as in this case the posterior
probability that action a′ has a higher quality is at least 60%).
Similarly, one can design plausible setups, in which the learning rules presented in all other constructions in
the paper are consistent with Bayesian inference and best-replying (omitted for brevity).
4.3 Any Environment with µl > 2 Admits Multiple Locally Stable States
Theorem 2 shows that any environment with a sample size larger than one admits multiple steady states, but
it does not address the question of whether these steady states are locally stable. In particular, the learning
rule presented in the proof of Theorem 2 (Case B) admits two steady states γ0 and γx∗ . It is relatively simple
to see that the state γx∗ is an almost global attractor: the population converges to γx∗ from any initial state γˆ
that assigns a positive probability to action a∗ (see the related continuous-time analysis in Oyama et al. (2015,
Sections 3.2 and 3.3)). Hence, γ0 is not locally stable. In the next two sections we characterize necessary and
sufficient conditions for environments to admit multiple locally stable states.
The following result shows that in any environment with a mean sample size larger than 2 it is possible
to define a learning rule that admits multiple locally stable states. According to this learning rule, each new
agent (1) plays action a′ if he observes action a′ at least twice in his sample, (2) plays action a′′ if he never
observes action a′, and (3) plays action a′ with probability q and action a′′ with probability 1−q, if he observes
action a′ exactly once.
Theorem 3. Let E = (A, β, ν) be an environment satisfying µl > 2. There exists a learning rule σ∗, such
that the learning process (E, σ∗) admits two different locally stable states.
The sketch of the proof is as follows (the formal proof is presented in Appendix B.2). If the incumbents play
action a′ with a frequency of x << 1, then the share of new agents who play action a′ is q·µl·x+(1− 2 · q)·O
(
x2
)
(the first term reflects the fact that the probability that a new agent plays action a′ is approximately q times
the expected number of times in which action a′ is observed, namely, µl · x; the second term “corrects” the
fact that when a new agent observes action a′ twice he plays action a′ with probability one rather than with
probability 2 · q). Choosing q < 1µl implies that a population in which very few agents play a′ converges to
12
no one playing a′. Choosing q sufficiently close to 1µl <
1
2 implies that a population in which a few more
agents play action a′ converges to a larger share of agents playing action a′ (due to the second-order term,
(1− 2 · q) ·O (x2), being positive).
4.4 Some Environments with 1 < µl < 2 Admit Multiple Locally Stable States
In this section we show that some (but not all) environments in which the mean sample size is between one
and two allow for a learning rule that admits multiple locally stable states.
Theorem 4 presents a family of environments with a mean sample size of up to two, in which every learning
rule admits at most one locally stable state. Specifically, we show that in any environment in which (1) there
are two feasible actions (|A| = 2), and (2) each new agent observes at most 2 actions, any learning rule admits
at most one locally stable state.
Theorem 4. Let E = (A = {a′, a′′} , β, ν) be an environment. Assume that ν (l) = 0 for each l > 2. Then for
any learning rule σ, the learning process (E, σ) admits at most one locally stable state.
The sketch of the proof of Theorem 4 is as follows (the formal proof is presented in Appendix B.3). In
environments with two actions, the state can be identified with a number x ∈ [0, 1] representing the frequency
of agents playing the first action. Recall that any steady state is a solution to the equation fσ (x) = x, where
fσ (x) is the dynamic mapping induced by learning rule σ. The fact that the maximal sample size is two
implies that fσ (x) is a polynomial of degree two. This implies that there are at most two steady states solving
fσ (x) = x. Simple geometric arguments regarding the intersection points of a parabola and the 45
◦ line imply
that at most one of these steady states can be locally stable (as illustrated in Figure 1).
Figure 1: Illustrations for the Intersections of a Parabola and the 45◦ Line
Theorem 4 presents a family of environments (which extends Case (2) in Example 1) in which the mean
sample size is between one and two, such that a simple “follow the majority” rule admits multiple locally stable
states. Specifically, in these environments (1) there are two feasible actions, (2) some agents observe a single
action and the remaining agents observe three actions, and (3) each agent plays the frequently observed action
in his sample. It is relatively straightforward to see that this process admits two locally stable steady states:
one in which all agents play the first action, and one in which all agents play the other action. In addition, the
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state in which half of the agents play each action is an unstable steady state. The formal proof of Theorem 4
is given in Appendix B.4.
Theorem 5. Let E = (A = {a′, a′′} , β, ν) be an environment. Assume that ν (1) < 1 and ν (1) + ν (2) = 1.
Then there exists a learning rule σ∗, such that (E, σ∗) admits multiple locally stable states.
4.5 Summary of Main Results
Combining the various results of this section shows that the environment’s mean sample size has important
implications for determining whether the initial behavior of the population has an influence on the long-run
behavior of the population.
Corollary 2. Let E be an environment with an expected sample size µl.
1. If µl < 1 (or µl = 1 and ν (1) 6= 1), then any learning rule admits a unique steady state that is globally
stable.
2. If 1 < µl ≤ 2, then there exists a learning rule that admits multiple steady states. By contrast, the
multiplicity of locally stable states depends on other details of the environment. That is, for each 1 <
µl ≤ 2 there exist environments E′, E′′ with mean sample size µl, such that Environment E′ generates a
learning rule that admits multiple locally stable states, while environment E′′ does not.
3. If µl > 2, then there exists a learning rule that admits multiple locally stable states.
5 Responsiveness and Effective Sample Size
In this section, we present simple notions of responsiveness and expected effective sample size, and use them to
derive a (weakly) tighter upper bound for processes that admit global attractors (relative to the upper bound
presented in Theorem 1).
5.1 Definitions
Fix a learning process P = (A, β, ν, σ). For each sample size l ∈ supp (ν), and each action a ∈ A , let σl (a)
(σl (a)) be the minimal (maximal) probability that learning rule σ assigns to action a after observing a sample
of size l, i.e.,
σl (a) = minm∈Alσm (a) (σl (a) = maxm∈Alσm (a) ) .
Let rl denote the maximal responsiveness of new agents to changes in observed samples of size l, which is
defined as follows:
rl = min
(
1, 12 ·
∑
a∈A
(σl (a)− σl (a))
)
, (4)
and let r0 = 0. The responsiveness effectively limits the maximal influence of different samples of length l on
the behavior of agents to be at most rl ≤ 1. One reason a learning rule may have have limited responsiveness is
that new agents might have strong priors about the best action, which are influenced only to a limited extent
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by their observed samples. Observe that when there are two actions (i.e., A = {a, b}), then , l is simply the
difference between the maximal and minimal probability assigned to each action, i.e.,
rl = σl (a)− σl (a) = σl (b)− σl (b) (A = {a, b}) . (5)
When there are more than two actions, 12 ·
∑
a∈A (σl (a)− σl (a)) may be larger than one. We bound rl from
above by one in Eq.(4) because, any change of sample cannot affect an agent’s mixed behavior by more than
one (as measured by the L1-distance over the set of mixed actions).
We call the product of the sample size and the responsiveness, rl · l the effective sample size. Let µel ∈
R+denote the effective sample size, i.e.,
µel =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · rl · l.
It is immediate that the effective sample size is always weakly smaller than the mean sample size in the
population; i.e., µel ≤ µl.
5.2 A Tighter Bound on the Distance between New States
Our main result in this section shows that the distance between two new states is at most (1− β + β · µel )
times the distance between the two initial states. This bound is (weakly) tighter than the one presented in
Theorem 1, as we replace expected sample size µl with the (weakly) smaller effective sample size µel . Formally,
Theorem 6. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a stationary learning process, and let γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ be two population states.
Then:
‖fP (γ)− fP (γ′)‖1 ≤ (1− β + β · µel ) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
where the inequality is strict if there exist a type θ and an l > 1 such that νθ (l) > 0.
Proof. The key step of the proof is to show the following inequality:
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
ν (l) · rl · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 . (6)
Inequality (6) is the same as (2) in the proof of Theorem 1, except for the factor of rl ≤ 1 on the RHS. All
other arguments of the proof of Theorem 1 remain the same. We prove (6) in Lemma 6 in Appendix B.5.
Observe that (1− β + β · µel ) < 1 iff µel < 1, and in this case fP is a contraction mapping, which implies
that fP admits a global attractor. This allows us to strengthen Corollary 1 as follows.
Corollary 3. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a learning process satisfying (1) µel < 1, or (2) µel = 1 and there is a
type θ ∈ Θ such that νθ (1) < 1. Then fP is a contraction mapping, which implies that (1) fP admits a unique
steady state γ∗, and (2) this unique steady state γ∗ is a global attractor (i.e., limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗ for each
γˆ ∈ Γ).
We demonstrate the implications of Corollary 3 in the following example.
Example 4. 1 Consider a population in which in each period a share of β ∈ (0, 1) of the incumbent agents
die, and are replaced with new agents. A population state describes the share of agents who use each of
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two competing technologies, a1 and a2. Each new agent observes the technology followed by a single random
incumbent. Assume that the learning rule used by the agents implies that each new agent plays (on average)
action a1 with a probability of α¯ ∈ [0, 1] after observing action a′, and with a probability of α < α¯ after
observing action a′′. Observe that the effective number of observations, µel , is equal to:
µel = µeθ = rθ,l=1 · 1 =
1
2 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
)
= 12 · ((α− α) + ((1− α)− (1− α))) = α− α,
which is strictly less than one if α < 1 or α > 0. Corollary 3 implies that the learning process converges to a
global attractor (which is the unique steady state) whenever α < 1 or α > 0.6
Our final result demonstrates that our bound of the effective sample size being less than one is tight.
Specifically, it shows that given any environment in which the expected sample size µl > 1, and any number
1 < y ≤ µl, there is a learning rule with an effective sample size of µel = y with multiple steady states.
Formally:
Theorem 7. Let E = (A, β, ν) be an environment satisfying µl > 1. Let 1 < y ≤ µl. Then there exists a
learning rule σ, such that the learning process (E, σ) admits two different steady states, and satisfies µel = y.
Proof. Let a and a′ be different actions (a 6= a′ ∈ A). Let σ∗ be a learning rule according to which each
agent plays action a∗ with a probability of yµl if he has observed action a
∗ at least once, and plays action a′
otherwise, that is,
σ∗
(
al
)
=

y
µl
· a∗ +
(
1− xµl
)
· a′ if ∃i, s.t., ali = a∗
a′ otherwise.
Observe that the responsiveness of (E, σ) is equal to x because:
µel ==
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · rl · l =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · 12 ·
∑
a∈A
(σl (a)− σl (a)) · l =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · 12 ·
((
y
µl
− 0
)
+
(
1−
(
1− y
µl
)
+ 0 + ...+ 0
))
· l =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · y
µl
· l = y
µl
·
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · l = y
µl
· µl = y.
It is immediate that the uniform population state in which all agents play action a′ (i.e., γ (a′) = 1) is a steady
state of the learning process (E, σ∗). An analogous argument to the one presented in Case B of the proof of
Theorem 2 shows that there exists x > 0 such that the uniform population state γx in which all agents play
action a∗ with probability x, and play action a′ with the remaining probability of 1 − x, is another steady
state of the learning process (E, σ∗).
6One can show that in this global attractor a share α1+α−α¯ of the agents play action a1. If α = 1 and α > 0, then any
population state is steady.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Extensions The basic model assumes that all agents share the same distribution of sample sizes, and the
same learning rule. In many applications the population might be heterogeneous, i.e., the population includes
various groups that differ in their sampling procedures and learning rules (see, e.g., Ellison & Fudenberg, 1993;
Munshi, 2004; Young, 1993b). In Appendix A.1 we formally extend our model and results to heterogeneous
populations.
The basic model assumes that the learning rule is stationary. In Appendix A.2 we extend our model and
results to time-dependent learning rules, and we characterize when a non-stationary environment admits a
unique sequence of states, such that it converges to this sequence of states from any initial population state.
Finally, we further extend the model in Appendix A.3 to stochastic shocks that influence the learning rules
of all agents (on the aggregate level), and we characterize when the initial population state may have a lasting
effect in such environments.
Repeated Interactions without Calendar Time. In many real-life situations agents are randomly
matched within a community, and these interactions have been going on since time immemorial. Model-
ing such situations as repeated games with a definite starting point and strategies that can be conditioned on
calendar time may be a problematic, as it seems implausible that agents would be aware of the the exact time
that has transpired since the starting point, and be aware of the very distant history of play of other agents.
An alternative approach is to model behavior in such situations as steady states of environments without a
calendar time (see, e.g., (Rosenthal, 1979; Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1995; Heller & Mohlin, 2017), and
the working paper version of Phelan & Skrzypacz, 2006).
An interesting question about such environments is whether the distribution of strategies used by the
players to choose their actions as a function of their observations is sufficient to uniquely determine the steady
states, or whether the same distribution of rules may admit multiple steady states. Our main result shows that
the former is true whenever the expected number of observed actions is less than one, while if the expected
number of observed actions is more than one, then there is always a distribution of rules with multiple steady
states.
Large Finite Populations. Our model studies infinite populations, and it is important to know what the
implications of our results are for large finite populations. The key difference between an infinite and a finite
population, is that in the former, the law of large numbers implies that the new state of the population is
a deterministic function of the initial state and the learning rule. By contrast, in finite populations the new
population state is a random variable. If the finite population is sufficiently large then we expect the resulting
stochastic process to be close to the deterministic process over finite time horizons. However, when time goes
to infinity, rare random events will occasionally take the population away from one (locally stable) steady state
towards another steady state (see Sandholm, 2011 for a textbook overview of the deterministic approximation
of stochastic evolutionary processes).
When dealing with large finite populations, one may therefore interpret our main result (Theorem 2) as
follows. In environments in which µl < 1, all learning processes admit a unique globally stable state γ∗. The
population is highly likely to quickly converge to state γ∗, and will almost always remain very close to this
state. In the rare event that the realized observations of many agents substantially differ from their expected
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values, the population may temporarily move away from γ∗, but with a very high probability the population
will quickly converge back to γ∗.
In environments in which µl > 1, there are learning rules that admit multiple steady states. The fact
that the population is finite and that the new population state is a random variable will typically quickly
take the population away from steady states that are not locally stable. If the environment admits multiple
locally stable states, then the initial state is highly likely to determine which of these locally stable states the
population converges to in the medium run. Moreover the population will likely stay there for a significant
amount of time.7
Observations of Action Profiles. In Heller & Mohlin (2017) we investigate environments in which an agent
may observe action profiles played in past interactions by the current opponent against her past opponents.
All of our results can be extended to this setup, with relatively minor adjustments to the proofs. Specifically
one should count an observation of an action profile (in a two-player game) as two actions when calculating
the expected number of observed actions µl. Our main result still holds in this setup: an environment allows
a profile of learning rules that admits multiple steady states, essentially, if and only if µl ≤ 1.
A Extensions
A.1 Heterogeneous Population
The basic model assumes that all agents share the same distribution of sample sizes, and the same learning
rule. In many applications the population might be heterogeneous, i.e., the population includes various groups
that differ in their sampling procedures and learning rules. A few examples of such models with heterogeneous
populations can be found in: (1) Ellison & Fudenberg (1993), who study competing technologies where each
technology is better for some of the players and these different tastes induce different learning rules (see also
Munshi, 2004); (2) Young (1993b), who studies social learning in a bargaining model in which agents differ
in the size of their samples; and (3) Heller & Mohlin (2017), who in a companion paper analyze community
enforcement in which the population includes several types of agents, and each type uses a different strategy.
A.1.1 Model with Heterogeneous Population
In what follows we introduce heterogeneous populations that include different types, and we redefine the
notions of population state, environment, and learning process to deal with this heterogeneity.
Population state. Let Θ denote a finite set of types with a typical element θ. Let λθ denote the mass
of agents of type θ (or θ-agents). For simplicity, we assume that λ has full support. We redefine a population
state (or state for short) to be a vector γ = (γθ)θ∈Θ, where each γθ ∈ ∆ (A) denotes the aggregate distribution
of actions played by θ-agents. Let γ¯ ∈ ∆ (A) denote the average distribution of actions in the population (i.e.,
7The literature on stochastic evolutionary game theory (starting with the pioneering works of Foster & Young, 1990; Kandori
et al., 1993; Young, 1993a; see Young, 2015, for a recent survey) studies situations the long-run behavior in environments with
multiple locally stable states, and in which there is a small level of noise in the agents’ behavior. We think that it would be
interesting to extend the methodology of this literature in order to apply it to the setup analyzed in this paper. It might be
that such future research can characterize various cases in which, if the population size is sufficiently large, in the long run the
population will spend almost all of the time in one of these locally stable states.
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γ¯ (a) =
∑
θ λθγθ (a) for each action a ∈ A). A population state is uniform if all types play the same aggregate
distribution of actions, i.e., if γθ (a) = γ¯ (a) for each type θ ∈ Θ and action a ∈ A. We redefine Γ to denote
the set of all populations with heterogeneous types.
New/Revising agents. In each period, a share of 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents of each type die and
are replaced with new agents (or, alternatively, are randomly selected to reevaluate their choice), while the
remaining 1− β share of the agents of each type play the same action as they played in the past.
Sample. Each new agent observes a finite sequence of actions (or sample). The size of the sample
observed by type θ is a random variable with a distribution νθ ∈ ∆ (N). Let M , the set of all feasible samples,
be redefined as: M = ∪θ∈Θ ∪l∈supp(νθ) Al. Let l¯ = maxl∈ (∪θ∈Θsupp (νθ)) < ∞ be the maximal sample size.
For each sample size l ∈ N , let ψl : Γ→ ∆
(
Al
)
denote the distribution of samples observed by each agent in
the population (or sampling rule for short), conditional on the sample having size l. A typical sample of size
l is represented by the vector −→a = (a1, ..., al).
We analyze two kinds of sampling methods in heterogeneous populations:
1. Observing different random agents: Each agent independently samples different agents, and observes a
random action played by each of these agents. This kind of sampling is a common modeling choice in
situations in which an agent’s payoff depends not on the behavior of a specific sub-group of opponents,
but on the agent’s own action, the state of nature, and, possibly, the aggregate behavior of the population
(see, e.g., Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995; Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Formally, we define for each sample
size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a1, ..., al),
ψl,γ (a1, ..., al) =
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯ (ai) . (7)
2. Observing a single random type: Each agent randomly draws a type θ¯, and then the agent samples
different agents of type θ¯, and observes a random action played by each of these θ¯-agents. This kind
of observation is relevant to models in which the agent is randomly matched with an opponent, and
may sample some actions played in the previous period by agents with the same type as the opponent.
Formally, we define for each size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a1, ..., al),
ψl,γ (a1, ..., al) =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∏
1≤i≤l
γθ (ai) . (8)
In the case of β = 1, this sampling method has another interpretation that is common in models of
strategic interactions among randomly matched agents (e.g., Rosenthal, 1979; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Heller & Mohlin, 2017). According to this interpretation, each agent is involved in n ≥ l¯ interactions
in each period. In each of these interactions the agent is randomly matched with a different opponent,
and the agent observes a sample of random actions played by the opponent in the previous round. The
random type of the opponent is distributed according to λθ, and each of the actions played by the
opponent of type θ in the previous round is distributed according to γθ.
Observe that both cases, i.e., (7) and (8), coincide in two special setups: (1) when the population state is
uniform (as in the basic model), or (2) when agents observe at most one action (i.e., l¯ = 1).
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Remark 2. Our results work also in a setup in which some types use the first sampling method, while other
types use the second sampling method.
Environment. We redefine an environment as a tuple
E =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ)θ∈Θ
)
that includes the six components described above: a finite set of actions A, a finite set of types Θ, a fraction
of new agents at each stage β, a sampling rule ψl (satisfying either (7) or (8)), a distribution over the set of
types λ, and a profile of distributions of sample sizes (νθ)θ∈Θ.
Given environment E =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ)θ∈Θ
)
, let µl, themean sample size, be redefined as the expected
number of actions observed by a random agent in the population. Formally:
µl =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · l.
Learning rule and stationary learning process. Each new θ-agent chooses his action in the new
population state by following a stationary (i.e., time-independent) learning rule σθ : M → ∆ (A). That is,
a new θ-agent who observes sample m ∈ M plays action a with probability σθ,m (a) . The remaining 1 − β
incumbent agents play the same action as in the previous round. A profile of learning rules (σθ)θ∈Θ is uniform
if all types use the same learning rule, i.e., if σθ = σθ′ for each type θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
A stationary learning process (or learning process for short) is a pair
P =
(
E, (σθ)θ∈Θ
)
=
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
,
consisting of an environment and a learning rule.
As in the basic model, let fP : Γ → Γ denote the mapping between states induced by a single step of the
learning process P .
L1-distance. Each population state γ ∈ Γ corresponds to a distribution qγ ∈ ∆ (Θ×A) as follows:
qγ (θ, a) = λθ · γθ (a). We define the distance between two population states γ, γ′ ∈ Γ as the L1-distance
between the corresponding distributions qγ , qγ; ∈ ∆ (Θ×A):
‖γ − γ′‖1 = ‖qγ − qγ′‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
a∈A
|λθ · γθ (a)− λθ · γ′θ (a)| =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 .
A.1.2 Generalizing Results
In what follows we formally show how to generalize the first result (Theorem 1) to heterogeneous populations.
Theorem 8. (Generalization of Theorem 1) Let P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
be a stationary learning
process, and let γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ be two population states. Then:
‖fP (γ)− fP (γ′)‖1 ≤ (1− β + β · µl) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if there exist a type θ and an l > 1 such that νθ (l) > 0.
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The intuition is similar to Theorem 1. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Similarly to the generalization of Theorem 1 above, one can generalize in a straightforward way all the
other results of the paper to the setup of a heterogeneous population (proofs omitted for brevity).
A.2 Non-Stationary Learning Process
In this section we further extend the model to deal with non-stationary deterministic learning processes, in
which the process explicitly depends on calendar time, and we show how to generalize our results to this setup.
Adaptations to the model. For each period t ≥ 1, let βt ∈ [0, 1] denote the random share of agents who
revise their actions in period t. For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ≥ 1, let νtθ ∈ ∆ (N) denote the distribution
of sample sizes of type θ in period t. To simplify the notation we assume that the support of the sample sizes
of each type is independent of the period, i.e., supp
(
νt1θ
)
= supp
(
νt2θ
)
:= supp (νθ) for each type θ ∈ Θ and
periods t1, t2 ≥ 1. As in the basic model, let M denote the set of all feasible sample sizes. A non-stationary
environment is a tuple
E =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t∈N , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ ,
(
νtθ
)
θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
.
Given a non-stationary environment, let µtl denote the expected number of actions observed in period t, i.e.,
µtl =
∑
θ∈Θ λθ
∑
l∈supp(νθ) ν
t
θ (l) · l.
Given a non-stationary environment E, let µ¯l be the upper limit of the geometric mean of 1− βt · (1− µtl)
as t goes to to infinity, i.e.,
µ¯l = limsuptˆ→∞ tˆ
√∏
t≤t0
(1− βt · (1− µtl)).
For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ≥ 1, let σtθ : M → ∆ (A) denote the non-stationary learning rule of new
θ-agents in period t. A non-stationary learning process is a pair consisting of a non-stationary environment
and a non-stationary learning rule, i.e.,
P =
(
E,
(
σtθ
)
θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
=
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ ,
(
νtθ, σ
t
θ
)
θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
.
As as in the basic model, a non-stationary learning process P and an initial state uniquely determine a new
state in each period t. Let f tp (γˆ) ∈ Γ denote the state induced after t stages of the non-stationary learning
process P .
A sequence of states (γ∗t )t∈N is a global attractor of the non-stationary learning process P , if
limt−→∞
∥∥f tP (γˆ)− γ∗t ∥∥1 = 0
for each initial state γˆ ∈ Γ.
Adapted results. Minor adaptations to the proof of Theorem 8 and a simple inductive argument im-
mediately imply that the distance between two states at time to is at most
∏
t≤t0 (1− βt + βt · µtl) the initial
distance. Formally:
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Corollary 4. Let P =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ, σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be a non-stationary learning process, let
γˆ, γˆ′ ∈ Γ be two population states, and let tˆ ≥ 1. Then:∥∥∥f tˆp (γˆ)− f tˆp (γˆ′)∥∥∥1 ≤ ‖γˆ − γˆ′‖1 ·∏
t≤tˆ
(
1− βt + βt · µtl
) ·
This, in turn, immediately implies that in any non-stationary environment in which µ¯l < 1, any profile of
non-stationary learning rules admits a global attractor. Formally:
Corollary 5. Let E =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be a non-stationary environment satisfying
µ¯l < 1. Then for any profile of non-stationary learning rules (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1, the non-stationary learning process
P =
(
E, (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
admits a global attractor.
The example presented in Case A of the proof of Theorem 2 demonstrates that the above bound of µ¯l < 1
is binding in the sense that there is an environment with µ¯l = 1 that admits a profile of learning rules with
multiple steady states.
The adaptation of the remaining results to the time-dependent setup is similar (proof omitted for brevity).
A.3 Process with Common Shocks
In this section we further extend our model to deal also with common stochastic shocks to the learning rules.
Additional adaptations to the model. In what follows we further adapt the model of Section A.2 by
allowing common stochastic shocks to the learning rules of the agents.
Let (Ω,F , p) be an arbitrary probability space. Each element ω ∈ Ω represents the state of nature, which
determines the realizations of all common shocks to the learning rules in all periods. For each type θ ∈ Θ and
period t ∈ N, let σtθ : Ω×M → ∆ (A) denote the state-dependent learning rule of new θ-agents in period t.
Our interpretation of the state-dependent learning rule σtθ is as follows. The state of nature determines a
distribution of noisy signals from which each new agent draws a signal. Based on this noisy signal as well as on
the sample of past actions (and on information about calendar time), each new agent chooses an action. The
choices of actions (which depend on the noisy signals) and the distribution of noisy signals jointly generate a
distribution of actions that depend only on the state of nature (and on calendar time), which is captured by
the state-dependent learning rule σtθ.
A learning process with common shocks is a pair consisting of a non-stationary environment and a state-
dependent learning rule, i.e., P =
(
E, (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
=
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ, σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
.
Learning processes with commons shocks are important in modeling situations in which there are stochastic
factors that influence the learning rules of all new agents in period t. For example , Ellison & Fudenberg (1995)
model a situation in which new agents in period t choose between two agricultural technologies, and each such
new agent observes a noisy signal about the expected payoff of each technology conditional on the weather in
period t (which is common to all agents), where the (unknown) state of nature determines the weather in all
periods.
The state of nature, the learning process, and the initial population state uniquely determine the population
state in each period. Let f tp (ω) (γˆ) ∈ Γ denote the population state induced after t stages of the non-stationary
learning process P , given an initial population state γˆ, and state of nature ω ∈ Ω.
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We say that a sequence of state-dependent population states (γ∗t )t≥1, where γ∗t : Ω→ Γ, is a state-dependent
global attractor of the learning process with commons shocks P if, for each ω ∈ Ω, limt−→∞ ‖f tP (ω) (γˆ)− γ∗t (ω)‖1 =
0 for each initial state γˆ ∈ Γ.
Example 5 below demonstrates how to apply the extended model to a social learning process with competing
technologies with common shocks:
Example 5 (Competing Technologies with Common Shocks). Consider a stochastic environment in which
there are two possible regimes {1, 2}. There are two technologies: a1 and a2. Technology a1 is advantageous
in regime 1, while technology a2 is advantageous in regime 2. There is a uniform common prior about the
regime in round 1. In each subsequent round, the regime is the same as in the previous round with probability
99%, and it is a new regime with probability 1%. In each round, a share of 25% of the incumbents die,
and are replaced with new agents. Each new agent observes the action of a single random incumbent and
a noisy signal about the current regime, and based on these observations, the agent chooses one of the two
technologies. Assume that the learning rule used by the agents implies that each new agent plays action a1:
1. with a probability of 95% after observing action a1 in regime 1;
2. with a probability of 80% after observing action a1 in regime 2;
3. with a probability of 20% after observing action a2 in regime 1;
4. with a probability of 5% after observing action a2 in regime 2.
One can show that the environment admits a unique steady state that is a state-dependent global attractor.
The induced aggregate behavior of the population converges towards playing action a1 with an average prob-
ability of 80% in regime 1, and it converges towards playing action a1 with an average probability of 20% in
regime 2.
This learning process with common shocks is modeled as
P =
(
{a1, a2} , {θ} , (βt ≡ 25%)t∈N , ψl, λθ,
(
νtθ ≡ 1, σtθ
)
t≥1
)
.
The set of states of nature Ω =
{
(ωn)n∈N
}
is the set of infinite binary sequences, where each ωn ∈ {1, 2}
describes the regime in round n. The definition of (F , p) is derived from the Markovian process determining
the regime in each round in a standard way. Given state ω = (ωn)n∈N , let the learning rule be defined as
follows:
σθ (a1, ω) =

95% a = a1 and ωt = 1
80% a = a1 and ωt = 2
20% a = a2 and ωt = 1
5% a = a2 and ωt = 2.
Adapted Results. Minor adaptations to the proof of Theorem 8 imply that the distance between two states
at time tˆ is at most
∏
t≤tˆ (1− βt + βt · µtl) the initial distance. Formally:
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Corollary 6. Let P =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ, σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be a learning process with commons shocks,
let γˆ, γˆ′ ∈ Γ be two population states, and let tˆ ∈ N. Then, for each ω ∈ Ω,∥∥∥f tˆp (ω) (γˆ)− f tˆp (ω) (γˆ′)∥∥∥1 ≤ ‖γˆ − γˆ′‖1 ·∏
t≤tˆ
(
1− βt + βt · µtl
) ·
An immediate corollary is that any environment with common shocks in which µ¯l < 1, given any profile of
learning rules, admits a state-dependent global attractor. That is, in the long run, the population’s behavior
depends only on the state of nature, but it is independent of the initial population state in time zero. Formally:
Corollary 7. Let E =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be an environment satisfying µ¯l < 1. Then for
any profile of stochastic learning rules (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1, the learning process with common shocks P =
(
E, (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
admits a state-dependent global attractor.
The adaptation of the remaining results to the time-dependent setup is similar to the adaptation above
(proof omitted for brevity).
B Formal Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 8 (Upper Bound Result; Generalization of Theorem 1)
The distance between the final population states is bounded as follows (where the second inequality is strict
if νθ (l) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ and l ≥ 2):
‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ≤
β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 =
(
β ·
(∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · l
)
+ (1− β)
)
· ‖γ − γ′‖ = (β · µL + 1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖ = (1− β · (1− µl)) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 .
The first inequality is proven in Lemma 1. The second inequality (is strict if νθ (l) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ and
l ≥ 2) is implied by the inequality
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 (with a strict inequality if l ≥ 2),
which is proven in Lemma 4.
Proofs of the various Lemmas used in the Proof of Theorem 8
Lemma 1. For each learning environment E and states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ,
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 .
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Proof.
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
(
β ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1
)
=
β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ′‖1 =
β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
where the inequality is due to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For each social learning environment E, type θ ∈ Θ, and each two states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ:
‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 .
Proof.
‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 =
∑
a∈A
|(fP (γ))θ (a)− (fP (γ′))θ (a)| =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ∑
l∈supp(νθ)
β · νθ (l)
∑
m∈Al
ψl,γ (m) · σθ,m + (1− β) · γθ
 (a)
−
β · ∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∑
m∈Al
ψl,γ′ (m) · σθ,m + (1− β) · γ′θ
 (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣β ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a) + (1− β) · (γθ (a)− γ′θ (a))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (9)
∑
a∈A
β · ∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ (1− β) · |γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)|
 =
β ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ (1− β) ·
∑
a∈A
|γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)| ≤ (10)
β ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γθ − γ′θ′‖1 ,
where the (9) is a triangle inequality, and (10) is due to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For each social learning environment E, each size l ∈ N, each type θ ∈ Θ, and any two states
γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ:
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
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Proof.
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
a∈A
∑
m∈Al
|ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| · σθ,m (a)
=
∑
m∈Al
|ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| ·
∑
a∈A
σθ,m (a)
=
∑
m∈Al
|ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| · 1,
where the inequality is a triangle inequality.
Lemma 4. For each social learning environment E, type θ ∈ Θ, sample size l ∈ N, and states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if l > 1.
Proof. Case I - Observing different random agents:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 =
∑
−→a ∈Al
|ψl,γ (−→a )− ψl,γ′ (−→a )| = (11)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯ (ai)−
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯′ (ai)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (12)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
1≤i≤l
(γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)) ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (< if l > 1) (13)
∑
−→a ∈Al
 ∑
1≤i≤l
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
 ∑
−→a ∈Al
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
(∑
ai∈A
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)|
)
·
 ∑
(ai+1,...,al)∈Al−i
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj)
 ·
 ∑
(a1,...,ai−1)∈Ai−1
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
 = (14)
∑
1≤i≤l
(∑
ai∈A
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)|
)
· 1 · 1 =
∑
1≤i≤l
(‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1) = l · ‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖ .
Eq. (11) is due to the independence of different observations. Eq. (12) is implied by adding to the sum
elements that cancel out. Specifically, let bi = γ¯ (ai) and ci = γ¯′ (ai); then due to a “telescoping series”
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argument (in which each new element appears once with a positive sign and once with a negative sign):8
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯ (ai)−
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯′ (ai) =
∏
1≤i≤l
bi −
∏
1≤i≤l
ci =
(b1 · ... · bl − c1 · b2 · ... · bl) + (c1 · b2 · ... · bl + c1 · c2 · b3 · ... · bl)− c1 · c2 · b3 · ... · bl + ...+ c1 · ... · cl =
(b1 − c1) · b2 · ... · bl + (b2 − c2) · b3 · ... · bl · c1 + (b3 − c3) · b4 · ... · bl · c1 · c2...+ (bl − cl) · c2 · ... · cl =
=
∑
1≤i≤l
(bi − ci) · ∏
i<j≤l
bj ·
∏
1≤j<i
cj
 = ∑
1≤i≤l
(γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)) ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak) .
Eq. (13) is a triangle inequality, and it is strict if l > 1 because the sum inside the “
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣” in (13) includes
both positive and negative elements. Eq. (14) holds because each sum adds the probabilities of disjoint and
exhausting events. The final inequality is implied by Lemma 5.
Case II - Observing a single random type:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 =
∑
−→a ∈Al
|ψl,γ (−→a )− ψl,γ′ (−→a )| = (15)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∏
1≤i≤l
γθ (ai)−
∏
1≤i≤l
γ′θ (ai)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (16)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∑
1≤i≤l
(γθ (ai)− γ′θ (ai)) ·
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj) ·
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (< if l > 1) (17)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∑
1≤i≤l
|γθ (ai)− γ′θ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj) ·
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∑
−→a ∈Al
|γθ (ai)− γ′θ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj) ·
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
(∑
ai∈A
|γθ (ai)− γ¯θ ′ (ai)|
)
·
 ∑
(ai+1,...,al)∈Al−i
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj)
 ·
 ∑
(ai,...,ai−1)∈Ai−1
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
 =
(18)∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
(∑
ai∈A
|γθ (ai)− γ¯θ ′ (ai)|
)
· 1 · 1 =
∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 =
∑
1≤i≤l
‖γ − γ′‖1 = l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 .
Eq. (15) is due to the different observations being independent conditional on the observed type θ. Eq. (16)
is implied by adding to the sum elements that cancel out (i.e., a “telescoping series”). Eq. (17) is a triangle
inequality, and it is strict if l > 1 because the sum inside the “
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣” in (17) includes both positive and negative
elements. Eq. (18) holds because each sum adds the probabilities of disjoint and exhausting events.
Lemma 5. ‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1 ≤ ‖γ − γ′‖1 for each two states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ.
8We use the convention that a product of an empty set (e.g.,
∏
1≤j<1) is equal to one.
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Proof.
‖γ − γ′‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
a∈A
|γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)| =
∑
a∈A
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · |γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)| ≥
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∑
θ∈Θ
λθ (γθ (a)− γ′θ (a))
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∑
θ∈Θ
λθγθ (a)−
∑
θ∈Θ
λθγ
′
θ (a)
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
a∈A
|γ¯ (a)− γ¯′ (a)| = ‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1 ,
where the various equalities are immediately implied by the definitions on the L1-norm and γ¯, and the inequality
is a triangle inequality.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3 (µl > 2)
For each 0 < q < 1µl define σq as the learning rule according to which each agent plays action a
∗ if he has
observed action a∗ at least twice, plays action a′ if he has not observed action a∗, and he plays action a∗ with
probability q and action a′ with the remaining probability 1− q; that is, for each al ∈ Al,
σ∗
(
al
)
=

a∗
∣∣{i|ali = a∗}∣∣ ≥ 2
q · a∗ + (1− q) · a′ ∣∣{i|ali = a∗}∣∣ = 1
a′
∣∣{i|ali = a∗}∣∣ = 0.
Observe that new agents play only a∗ or a′. Further note that the probability that a new agent plays a∗
depends only on the frequency with which the incumbents play action a∗ (and not on any other aspect of the
population state). Thus, by a slight abuse of notation, we identify a state γ ∈ ∆ (A) with the frequency x of
agents who choose action a∗, i.e., x := γ (a) (as the actions played by the remaining 1 − x of the agents do
not play any role in the dynamics, and in the long run each agent plays either action a∗ or a′ ). The mapping
induced by the environment Pq = (E, σq) is given by the function fq : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] (neglecting terms that are
O
(
x3
)
):
fq (x) := f(Pq) (x) = (1− β) · x+ β ·
q · µl · x+ (1− 2 · q) · ∑
2≤l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) ·
(
l
2
)
· x2 +O (x3)
 . (19)
The argument for (19) is as follows. The term of (1− β) · x describes the behavior of incumbents who have
not died. The terms multiplying β represent the behavior of new agents. The first of these terms (q · µl · x)
derives from the fact that the first-order approximation for the probability that a new agent plays action a′
is q times the expected number of times that action a′ is observed (µl · x), since action a′ is almost always
observed once in a sample. The second term multiplying β in (19) reflects the correction required to adjust the
above first-order approximation due to the fact that an agent who observes action a′ twice in the sample plays
action a′ with probability 1, rather than with probability 2 · q. Hence, the additional probability of playing a∗
conditional on observing a∗ twice is (1− 2 · q). The probability of observing a∗ twice in a random sample is∑
2≤l∈supp(ν) ν (l) ·
(
l
2
)
·x2 +O (x3). Finally, note that the probability of observing a∗ three or more times
is negligible (i.e., O
(
x3
)
), so that the remaining adjustment required for (19) to coincide with the dynamic
mapping induced by Pq is O
(
x3
)
.
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It is immediate from the definition of learning rule σ∗ that fq (x) is strictly increasing in x. Recall that
state x is a steady state iff fq (x) = x. Observe that: fq (0) = 0 and f ′q (0) = q · µl < 1 for each q < 1µl . Fix
q < 1µl . The previous observations imply that there exists x¯ > 0 such that fq (x) < x and f
′
q (x) < 1 for each
x ∈ (0, x¯). This implies that f tq (x) < x and limt→∞ f tq (x) = 0 for each x ∈ (0, x¯), and hence state 0 is locally
stable.
Assume that ν (0) = ν (1) = 0. Then, the definition of learning rule σ∗ implies that fq (1) = 1, and that
for each  << 1 it holds that
fq (1− ) = (1− β) · (1− ) + β ·
(
1− ν (2) · 2 ·  · (1− q) +O (2)) .
This is so because when x = 1 −  and  << 1, a new agent plays action a′ with probability 1 − q when
observing action a∗ once in a sample of size two (the probability of this event is given by ν (2) ·2 ·). Moreover,
observing a∗ once in a longer sample (or not observing a∗ at all) is a rare event with a probability of O
(
2
)
.
This implies that for each q < 0.5, there is ¯ > 0, such that for each x > 1− ¯: (1) f tq (x) > x for each t, and
(2) limt→∞ f tq (x) = 1 . This shows that the state 1 is locally stable.
We are left with the case in which ν (0) > 0 or ν (1) > 0. Observe that (1) limq−→ 1µl f
′
q (0) = 1 and (2)
f ′′q (0) > 0 for each q < 1µl . This implies (by a Taylor approximation around x = 0) that there exists (q
∗, xˆ)
satisfying: (1) 0 < xˆ << 1, (2) q∗ < 1µl , (3) fq∗ (xˆ) = xˆ, (4) fq∗ (x) < x for each x ∈ (0, xˆ), and (5) f ′q∗ (xˆ) > 1.
This implies that xˆ is an (unstable) steady state.
Next observe that fq∗ (xˆ) = xˆ, f ′q∗ (xˆ) > 1, and fq∗ (1) < 1. These observations, due to the intermediate
value theorem and standard arguments, imply that there exists xˆ < x∗ < 1, such that fq∗ (x∗) = x∗ and
f ′q∗ (x∗) < 1. This, in turn, implies that there exists ¯ > 0, such that for each x ∈ (x∗ − ¯, x∗ + ¯): (1)
fq∗ (x) < x if x < x∗, (2) fq∗ (x) > x if x > x∗, and (3) f ′q∗ (x) < 1. These observations imply (due to the
monotonicity of fq∗) that for each x∗ 6= x ∈ (x∗ − ¯, x∗ + ¯): (1) f tq (x) is strictly between x and x∗ for each t,
and (2) limt→∞ f tq (x) = x∗. Hence, state x∗ is locally stable.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 4 (Two Feasible Actions, µ (l) = 0 ∀l > 2)
Let E = (A = {a′, a′′} , β, ν) be an environment satisfying ν (l) = 0 for each l > 2. Let σ be an arbitrary
learning rule. The fact that there are two feasible actions (i.e., |A| = 2) implies that we can identify a
population state with a number x ∈ [0, 1] representing the frequency of agents who play action a′. Let fσ (x)
be the dynamic mapping induced by learning rule σ. The fact that the maximal length of the sample observed
by new agents is two implies that fσ (x) is a polynomial of degree at most two. Specifically, the explicit formula
for fσ (x) is given by:
fσ (x) = (1− β) · x+ β · [ν (0)σ (∅) (a′) + ν (1) · (x · σ (a′) (a′) + (1− x) · σ (a′′) (a′)) +
ν (2) ·
(
x2 · σ (a′, a′) (a′) + (1− x)2 · σ (a′′, a′′) (a′) + x · (1− x) · (σ (a′, a′′) (a′) + σ (a′′, a′) (a′))
)]
=
= b · x2 + c · x+ d,
where b, c, d ∈ R. Recall that x∗ is a steady state iff f (x∗) = x∗. We conclude the proof by looking at three
exhaustive cases. Cases 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 1 in Section 4.4.
1. Case 1: b = 0 (recall, that b is the parameter multiplying x2 in the formula for fσ (x)). If fσ (x) ≡ x (i.e.,
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if fσ (x) = x for each x), then any state is steady, but none is locally stable. Otherwise, the equation
fσ (x) = x has at most one solution, and, hence, σ∗ has at most one locally stable state.
2. Case 2: b > 0. The equation fσ (x) = x has at most two solutions. Assume that it has two solutions
in the interval [0, 1] (otherwise, it is immediate that σ admits at most one locally stable state). Simple
geometric arguments (regarding the incidence points of a parabola satisfying fσ (1) ≤ 1 and the 45◦
line) imply that one of these solutions must be one (i.e., fσ (1) = 1), and that f ′σ (1) > 1. By standard
continuity arguments there exists a sufficiently small ¯ > 0 such that f ′σ (x) > 1 for each x > 1 − ¯.
This implies that for each x > 1− ¯: (1) f tσ (x) < x, and (2) if limt→∞ f tσ (x) exists then it must satisfy
limt→∞ f tσ (x) < 1 − ¯. Hence, state 1 cannot be locally stable, and the learning rule σ admits at most
one locally stable state.
3. Case 3: b < 0. Assume that the equation fσ (x) = x has two solutions in the interval [0, 1] (otherwise,
it is immediate that σ admits at most one locally stable state). Simple geometric arguments (regarding
the points of intersection of a parabola bounded with positive values and the 45◦ line) imply that one of
these solutions must be zero (i.e., fσ (0) = 0), and that f ′σ (0) > 1. By standard continuity arguments
there exists a sufficiently small ¯ > 0 such that f ′σ (x) > 1 for each x ∈ (0, ¯). This implies that for
each x ∈ (0, ¯): (1) f tσ (x) > x, and (2) if limt→∞ f tσ (x) exists then it must satisfy limt→∞ f tq (x) > ¯.
This implies that state x∗ cannot be locally stable, and hence learning rule σ admits at most one locally
stable state.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 5 (ν (1) + (ν (3) = 1) , “Follow Majority” Rule)
Let E = (A = {a′, a′′} , β, ν) be an environment, such that ν (l) = 0 for each l /∈ {1, 3} and ν (1) < 1. Let σ∗
be the learning rule in which each new agent follows the frequently observed action in his sample, i.e.,
σ∗ (a′) = σ∗ (a′, a′, a′) = σ∗ (a′, a′, a′′) = σ∗ (a′, a′′, a′) = σ∗ (a′′, a′, a′) = a′, and
σ∗ (a′′) = σ∗ (a′′, a′′, a′′) = σ∗ (a′′, a′′, a′) = σ∗ (a′′, a′, a′′) = σ∗ (a′, a′′, a′′) = a′′.
We identify a state with the number x ∈ [0, 1] representing the frequency of agents who play action a′. Let
fσ∗ (x) be the dynamic mapping induced by learning rule σ∗. The explicit formula for fσ∗ (x) is given by
fσ∗ (x) = (1− β) · x+ β ·
(
ν (1) · x+ ν (3) · (x3 + 3 · x2 · (1− x)) = ν (1) · x+ ν (3) · (3 · x2 − 2 · x3)) ,
and its derivative is given by
f ′σ∗ (x) = (1− β) + β · ν (1) + β · ν (3) ·
(
6 · x− 6 · x2) = (1− β) + β · ν (1) + β · 6 · ν (3) · x · (1− x) .
Observe that: (1) fσ∗ (x) is strictly increasing, (2) fσ∗ (x∗) = x∗ for three values of x: 0, 0.5, 1, (3) f ′σ∗ (0) =
f ′σ∗ (1) = ν (1) < 1, and (4) f ′σ∗ (0.5) = ν (1) + 1.5 · ν (3) > 1. These observations imply (by arguments
analogous to those in the proof of B.3 above) that the process (E, σ∗) admits three steady states: two locally
stable states, 0 and 1, and the locally unstable state 0.5.
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B.5 Lemma Required for the Proof of Theorem 6 (Bound with Responsiveness)
Lemma 6. For each social learning environment E, each size l ∈ N, and any two states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ:
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σm (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ rl · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
Proof. We begin with a preliminary definition. Let Alγ>γ′ ⊆ Al be the set of samples that have higher
probabilities given state γ than given state γ′, i.e.,
Alγ>γ′ =
{
m ∈ Al|ψl,γ (m) > ψl,γ′ (m)
}
.
We now prove the lemma: ∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σm (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σm (a)−
∑
m∈Al
γ′>γ
(ψl,γ′ (m)− ψl,γ (m)) · σm (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σl (a)−
∑
m∈Al
γ′>γ
(ψl,γ′ (m)− ψl,γ (m)) · σl (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣σl (a) ·
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m))− σl (a) ·
∑
m∈Al
γ′>γ
(ψl,γ′ (m)− ψl,γ (m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (20)
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(σl (a)− σl (a)) ·
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =∑
a∈A
(σl (a)− σl (a)) ·
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) =
∑
a∈A
(σl (a)− σl (a)) · 0.5 ·
∑
m∈Al
|(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m))|
 =
0.5 ·
∑
a∈A
(σl (a)− σl (a)) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
Equality (20) is implied by the fact that ψl,γ and ψl,γ′ are both distributions, and the sum of the differences
in the probabilities that they assign to samples of size l must be equal to zero. Thus we have shown that
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σm (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.5 ·
∑
a∈A
(σl (a)− σl (a)) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 , (21)
which together with Lemma 3 implies that the LHS of (21) is weakly smaller than rl · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
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